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We examine how country-level legal and institutional differences in creditor and 
shareholder rights shape the use of bond covenants.  Using comprehensive debt 
covenant information for a sample of Yankee bonds issued by firms from more 
than 50 countries, we find that bond contracts for firms incorporated in countries 
with stronger creditor rights  use fewer restrictive covenants.  This finding 
suggests that creditor rights laws substitute for debt covenants in reducing the 
agency cost of debt.  On the other hand, bond contracts for firms incorporated in 
legal regimes with stronger shareholder rights include more covenants, suggesting 
that greater shareholder rights may actually increase the shareholder-bondholder 
agency conflict.  These results are robust to alternative measures of creditor rights 
and shareholder rights.  We also document that stronger firm-level corporate 
governance is positively related to the use of restrictive covenants even after 
controlling for country institutions.  
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The “nexus of contracts” view of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; and 
Smith and Warner, 1979) suggests that the firms’ stakeholders contract to maximize firm value 
while reducing agency costs.  Under this view, management and shareholders agree on restrictive 
bond covenants to bind themselves from expropriating creditors.  In this sense, bond covenants 
are used to mitigate the agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders.  The number and 
types  of covenants depends on the  degree  of agency conflicts and  the costs of including 
restrictive covenants.
1
In this paper, we study how country-level legal investor protection shapes the use of 
contractual  creditor protection mechanisms in debt contracts, in particular, the use of bond 
covenants.
   
2
We draw our motivation from the recent law and finance literature.  One line of research 
documents that stronger legal and institutional creditor protection reduces loan spreads, increases 
loan maturity and quantity, and enhances ownership concentration (see Esty and Megginson, 
  We conjecture that legal investor protection can either increase or decrease the use 
of bond covenants depending on whether these laws alleviate or exacerbate agency conflicts 
between bondholders and shareholders.  Using a sample of Yankee bonds issued by firms from 
more than 50 countries, we find that bonds issued by firms incorporated in countries with 
stronger creditor rights use fewer restrictive covenants—thus, creditor rights laws substitute for 
debt covenants in reducing the agency cost of debt.  On the other hand, firms incorporated in 
legal regimes with strong shareholder rights generally use more restrictive covenants, suggesting 
that stronger shareholder protection may exacerbate  the shareholder-bondholder conflict and 
hence induce more restrictive covenant protections.   
                                                            
1 For further discussion, see Malitz (1986); Begley and Feltham (1999); Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2003); Billett, 
King and Mauer (2007); Qi and Wald (2008); and Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2008). 
2 In this paper, we use the terms shareholder protection, shareholder rights, and minority shareholders protection 
interchangeably. 2 
2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2007; and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer).  
While greater creditor protection laws provide creditors with improved recovery in bankruptcy, 
covenants provide restrictions on firm behavior prior to default.  Smith and Warner (1979) 
propose the costly contracting hypothesis, suggesting that if covenants are costly to implement, 
firms have an incentive to leave them out.  We therefore conjecture that better country creditor 
protection laws may lead firms to include fewer covenants in their debt contracts, as protection in 
bankruptcy may partly substitute for pre-bankruptcy debt restrictions.   
Another stream of law and finance research shows that legal and institutional protection 
of shareholders affects firm-level corporate governance, and in turn increases firm value (see, for 
example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV hereafter), 2000, 2002; and 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2007).
3
                                                            
3 Related research uses country-level data to study how differences in laws and institutions affect financial market 
development and economy growth (see, for example, LLSV, 1998; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007; and 
Djankov, Hart, Mcliesh, and Shleifer, 2008). 
  However, better shareholder protection is not necessarily 
good news for all the firm’s stakeholders.  In particular, if management’s interests are more 
closely aligned with shareholders’ interests, managers may be more likely to take advantage of 
opportunities to shift wealth from creditors to stockholders.  Conversely, if managers are not 
closely aligned with shareholders, managers may be more likely to “enjoy the quiet life” as 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) show.  This “quiet life” may be a boon for bondholders, even 
though it significantly decreases stockholder value.  Prior evidence on the cost of debt supports 
this argument.  Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005), Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007), and Chava, 
Livdan, and Purnanandam (2008) find that less takeover protection is associated with a higher 
cost of debt, and this lower takeover protection is typically associated with decreased managerial 
entrenchment and stronger governance.  If this higher cost of debt reflects an increase in the 
potential stockholder-bondholder conflict, then we similarly expect to find that stronger legal 3 
protection of shareholders is associated with the use of more bond covenants.  Thus, while our 
first hypothesis is that greater creditor rights are associated with the use of fewer covenants, our 
second hypothesis is that laws or institutions providing greater shareholder protection are 
associated with more covenant use.    
We consider a sample of Yankee bonds with detailed covenant information from more 
than 50 countries.  As these bonds are issued in the U.S., they are subject to U.S. securities laws.  
However,  creditors of Yankee bonds  are still affected by home-country institutions.
4
Both creditor rights and shareholder rights impact the use of covenants significantly when 
measured with the covenants index.  Specifically, for creditor rights, a one unit increase is 
associated with a reduction of 23% to 38% in the number of covenants used.  This negative 
  Our 
analysis considers whether the debt contract contains any covenants, a covenant index equal to 
the number of covenants included in the debt contract, sub-indices for different covenant 
categories, and the use of individual covenants.  Our main measure of country-level creditor 
protection is a creditor rights index (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007; and LLSV, 1998), 
and our main measure of shareholder protection is the revised anti-director index (Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008).  We also separate these indices into their sub-
scores and consider alternative measures of creditor and shareholder protection, including a firm-
level governance index, as proposed by the existing literature.  
We find weak evidence that creditor rights are negatively related to the likelihood that a 
bond includes any covenants and strong evidence that shareholder rights are positively related to 
the probability of using covenants.  Increasing shareholder rights by one implies a 5% to 14% 
higher probability of including covenants in the bond contract.     
                                                            
4 For instance, Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002) show that home country creditor protection impacts yield spreads 
for Yankee bonds. 4 
relation between creditor protection and the use of covenants strongly supports our first 
hypothesis, that country-level protection laws substitute for firm-level contracting.  We also find 
that greater shareholder rights are significantly positively related to covenant use, supporting our 
second hypothesis.
5
We further examine how creditor and shareholder rights affect the use of individual 
covenants.  Creditor rights are negatively related to all types of individual covenants whereas the 
impact of shareholders rights on individual covenants is mixed.  Shareholder rights are positively 
associated with the use of covenants that reduce expropriation of bondholder wealth, such as 
restrictions on dividend payments, additional debt borrowing, asset and investment restrictions, 
and covenants related to default.  Thus, greater shareholder rights may imply that management is 
more active on behalf of stockholders, and this may increase the incidence of conflicts between 
shareholders and bondholders.  This finding is consistent with Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell 
(2005), Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007), and Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2008) who show 
that firms with stronger corporate governance are charged higher rates in the credit market.  It is 
interesting to note that shareholder rights are negatively related to stock issuance covenants, 
  A one unit increase in shareholder rights is associated with a 21% to 33% 
increase in the covenants index.   
We then break down the creditor rights and shareholder rights indices into their 
components and consider which component has the largest impact on covenant use.  Out of the 
creditor rights laws, we find that laws which ensure that secured creditors are paid first have the 
largest (most negative) economic and statistical impact on the use of bond covenants.  From the 
shareholder rights index, we find that preemptive rights, which limit the issuance of shares to 
related parties at below-market prices, have the largest impact on covenant use. 
                                                            
5 A related issue, outside the scope of this paper, is the degree to which covenants are priced in the bond markets; 
see Bradley and Roberts (2003), and Reisel (2007), and Wei (2005). 5 
suggesting that firms with well-aligned minority interests may already avoid the dilutive effects 
of stock issuances.  Therefore, strong shareholder rights substitute for covenants restricting stock 
issuance.   
To shed more light on the interaction between firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms and country-level investor protection, we collect corporate governance data for our 
sample of international firms from Institutional Shareholder Services  (ISS).  This splits our 
sample in half as coverage is not complete.  We document, after controlling for country-level 
investor protection, that strong firm-level corporate governance is positively correlated with the 
use of several types of restrictive covenants.  This result is consistent with our finding that strong 
shareholder rights may increase the shareholder-bondholder conflict.
6
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways.  First, we advance the 
bond covenant literature (see, e.g., Smith and Warner, 1979, among others) by showing that 
country-level laws and institutions are important determinants of firm-level contract design.  
Second, we extend the law and finance literature (see, e.g., LLSV, 2000, 2002, among others).  
We jointly consider the institutional creditor protection as well as shareholders protection in 
determining the use of restrictive bond covenants.  We show how country-level institutions can 
either increase or decrease the use of bond covenants depending on whether these institutions 
alleviate or exacerbate agency conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.  In addition, as 
we show that restrictive covenants substitute for creditor rights, our results suggest that previous 
findings (see, e.g., Qian and Strahan, 2007) understate the degree to which creditor rights laws 
reduce the cost of debt.  That is, since firms in less protected legal regimes are more likely to 
include greater covenant protection in their debt contracts, the value of creditor rights protection 
 
                                                            
6 There is also some limited research on the impact of firm-level governance covenant use for the U.S.  Specifically, 
Begley and Feltham (1999) find a positive relation between the use of covenants and both the CEO’s equity 
ownership and the ratio of equity to cash compensation. 6 
to bondholders would be stronger after considering restrictive covenants than the literature 
suggests.  Finally, this paper complements the corporate governance literature which shows how 
firms with stronger corporate governance may be punished in credit markets (see, e.g., Cremers, 
Nair, and Wei, 2007).  
Relatively little prior research has addressed international bond contracting.  Anderson 
(1999) studies a sample of Brazilian bond contracts and shows how they are designed to mitigate 
particular  institutional problems including high inflation risk and weak national institutions.  
Miller and Reisel (2009) is a concurrent paper examining Yankee bond covenants.  Our results 
are different from Miller and Reisel’s in that we find stronger shareholder rights may increase 
the agency cost of debt and induce more restrictive covenants whereas they show that stronger 
shareholder rights reduce the use of covenants.  This difference arises from our joint examination 
of creditor and shareholder rights, while including other institutional variables as controls, 
whereas they individually  examine the impact of each institutional variable on the use of 
covenants.  In addition, Miller and Reisel use the anti-self dealing index as the measure of 
shareholder rights while we use the revised anti-director index as our primary measure of 
shareholder rights and the anti-self dealing index as a robustness check.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I details the data and empirical 
method.  Section II presents the main empirical results, Section III provides robustness tests, and 
Section IV concludes.  
 
I.  Data 
We compile legal and institutional variables, country-level characteristics, firm-level, and 
bond-level data from various sources.  Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix A, and 7 
covenant features are detailed in Appendix B.  In this section, we describe our sample as well as 
the measurement of bond covenants, institutional variables, and controls. 
 
A. Yankee Bond Sample 
We gather data on bond issues from Mergent’s Fixed Investment Securities Database 
(FISD).  FISD contains detailed information on bonds at the time of issuance, such as offering 
amount, call and put features, bond ratings, and bond covenants.  Using the 2007 version of 
FISD, we extract a sample of Yankee bonds issued by non-U.S. firms in the U.S. domestic bond 
market (in U.S. dollars).    Foreign  government, agency, and quasi-government issuers are 
excluded.  We also exclude  medium-term notes,  as  FISD provides typically no covenant 
information for these issues.  We exclude all bonds for which the “subsequent” data flag is set to 
“no” indicating that FISD does not provide covenant information for this particular issue.  The 
initial sample includes 1,884  bond  issues from 68 countries.    We delete bonds for which 
information on the issuer’s country is missing, and drop bonds issued before 1991.  This leaves 
us with a sample of 1,351 bonds issued by 639 firms from 57 countries.  
 
B. Covenant Variables  
Our dependent variables are whether or not the issue includes any bond covenants, the 
number of covenants, and more specific variables about the type of covenants used.  For each 
bond issue, FISD reports more than 50 variables on bondholder protective, issuer restrictive, and 
subsidiary restrictive covenants.  Typically, there are multiple covenants that restrict the same 
activity.  Therefore, we group FISD covenant variables into 22 covenant dummies that indicate 
whether a specific type of activity is restricted.  For example, a dividend payment dummy 
indicates if there is a covenant limiting dividend payments of the issuer or a subsidiary of the 8 
issuer.  Similarly, a funded debt dummy specifies if there is a covenant restricting the issuer or a 
subsidiary of the issuer from issuing additional debt.  Our construction of these 22 covenant 
dummies is similar to Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) in which they group FISD’s covenants 
into 15 indicators.
7
The third covenant category is asset and investment restrictions, which limits asset sales, 
restricts the issuer in certain business dealings with its subsidiaries, and restricts subsidiaries’ 
   
We further classify the 22 covenant indicators into eight major covenant categories.  
These eight covenant categories comprise of payment restrictions, borrowing restrictions, asset 
and investment restrictions, stock issuance restrictions, default-related covenants, anti-takeover-
related covenants, profit maintenance covenants, and rating triggers covenants.  We create 
covenant indices for each category by summing the covenant dummy variable within each 
category.  A higher index score indicates stronger creditor protection for a specific type of 
activity.  For each category, we also create a dummy variable indicating whether there are any 
covenants related to this type of restriction.  
The first category is payment restrictions consisting of two covenant dummies, dividend 
related payments and other restricted payments.  The second category is borrowing restrictions 
including eight covenant dummy variables, restricting the firm from additional debt activities.  
Specifically, these restrictions prevent the issuer and/or issuer’s subsidiaries from issuing 
additional debt with a maturity of one year or longer, restrict the issuer from issuing additional 
subordinate, senior, or secured debt, and limit total leverage.  Moreover, these borrowing-related 
covenants place restrictions on asset sale-and-leaseback transactions, on the acquisition of liens 
on property, and on the issuance of guarantees.  
                                                            
7 The additional seven covenant dummies we consider are covenants on liens, restrictions on issuing guarantees, 
restrictions on transactions with affiliates, preferred stock issuance restrictions, and stock transfers restrictions, and 
covenants requiring minimum earnings and net worth. 9 
investments.  The fourth category, stock issuance restrictions, contains three covenants which 
limit additional common stock issuance, preferred stock issuance, and stock transfers between 
the issuer and its subsidiaries.  Default-related covenants  protect bondholders by  triggering 
default in their bond contract should default occur in any other debt of the firm.  Two covenants 
comprise the anti-takeover-related covenants  category.  A poison put covenant gives 
bondholders the option to sell back their bonds to the issuer should a change of control of the 
issuer occur.  A merger covenant indicates that a consolidation or merger of the issuer with 
another entity is restricted.  Finally, the last two categories are profit maintenance covenants and 
rating trigger covenants.  Profit maintenance covenants require the issuer or its subsidiaries to 
maintain a minimum earnings ratio or net worth.  A rating trigger covenant protects bondholders 
from credit rating changes by providing a put provision in the event of a rating decline.  Since in 
our sample the profit maintenance and rating trigger covenants are used in less than 2% of bond 
issues, we do not consider them explicitly in our empirical analysis.   
Besides the 22 covenant indicators, and the 8 covenant categories, we also create an 
overall covenant index of bondholder protection by summing the 22 covenant indicators for each 
bond.  Lastly, we define a covenant dummy that equals one if any covenants are used.  Detailed 
classifications and descriptions of all covenant variables are provided in Appendix B.  
 
C. Country-level Creditor and Shareholder Protection  
We measure the country-level effectiveness of creditor protection with an index of 
aggregate creditor rights following LLSV (1998) and Djankov et al. (2007).  This index is 
compiled for each year from 1978 to 2003.
8
                                                            
8 As creditor rights rarely change, we set index values for the years 2004 to 2006 to those observed in 2003.  Our 
results are unaffected when we drop the years for which we do not have creditor rights information from the 
analysis. 
  Starting from a score of zero, the creditor rights 10 
index is incremented by one as each of the following requirements is met: (1) there are 
restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a debtor to file for 
reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the reorganization 
petition is approved, i.e., there is no automatic stay or asset freeze; (3) secured creditors are paid 
from the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm before other creditors such as the government or 
workers; and (4) management does not retain administration of its property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization.  The creditor rights index ranges from zero to four and a higher 
score corresponds to stronger creditor rights.   
We use the revised anti-director index from Djankov et al. (2008) as our main measure of 
the effectiveness of shareholder protection provided by a country’s commercial code and 
corporate laws.  Starting with a score of zero, the shareholder rights index is incremented by one 
as each of the following requirements is met: (1) shareholders are allowed to mail their proxy 
vote to the firm; (2) firms cannot require that shareholders deposit their shares prior to a general 
shareholders meeting, thus preventing them from selling those shares for a number of days; (3) 
shareholders are allowed to cast all their votes for one candidate standing for election to the 
board of directors (cumulative voting) or laws allow a mechanism of proportional representation 
in the board by which minority interests may name a proportional number of director to be 
board; (4) minority shareholders can launch a judicial venue to challenge the decisions of 
management or step out of the company by requiring the company to purchase their shares when 
they object to certain fundamental changes, such as merges, asset disposition, and changes in the 
articles of incorporation; (5) shareholders are granted the first opportunity to buy new issues of 
stock, and this right can be waived by shareholders only; and (6) the minimum percentage of 11 
ownership share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ 
meeting is less than 10 percent.   
To address Spamann’s (2008) concern that the original anti-director index is not accurate, 
we use Spamann’s anti-director index as a robustness check.  Since our purpose is to examine 
how legal and institutional investor protection impacts the use of covenants, we use the creditor 
rights index collected from bankruptcy laws and anti-director index collected from commercial 
codes or corporate laws as our main measures.  Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008) create an anti-self dealing index which focuses on private enforcement 
mechanism such as disclosure, approval, and litigation.  They argue that this legal control system 
serves a better legal protection of minority shareholders than the anti-director index.  We use this 
anti-self dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) as an alternative measure of shareholder 
rights.  Additionally, we examine the impact of each of the four and six components of creditor 
rights and shareholder rights on the use of bond covenants, respectively.  
Besides the degree of investor protection, the enforcement of these laws may also affect 
the use of covenants.  We therefore consider enforcement, measured with a public enforcement 
index from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006), which proxies for the quality of 
public enforcement of securities laws in a country.  We also use the effectiveness of bankruptcy 
law compiled by WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report (2005) as a measure of bankruptcy law 
enforcement.
9
  Djankov, Mcliesh, and Shleifer (2007) study the private creditor market in 129 countries 
and argue that  information-sharing institutions  substitute for creditor protection  laws in the 
   
                                                            
9 For robustness, we also consider measures of bankruptcy efficiency developed by Djankov, Hart, Mcliesh, and 
Shleifer (2008).  Specifically, we use a measure of how efficiently the bankruptcy of a hotel would be handled, and a 
variable measuring the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts.  The results with these measures 
are similar. 12 
development of credit markets.  We therefore include a dummy for public information sharing 
institutions, which indicates whether a public credit registry operates in the country.  In addition, 
we control for the general legal environment by including rule of law (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi, 2008), which measures the law and order tradition of a country.  In unreported tests, 
we use property rights to control for the general legal environment.  As the impact of property 
rights is very similar to that of the rule of law (these two variables have a 0.91 correlation), we 
only include rule of law in our specification.  We control for legal origin variables as a further 
robustness check.  
 
D. Control Variables  
We control for bond characteristics, firm characteristics, and other country factors.  The 
bond-level controls include dummy variables capturing whether the bond issue is a private 
placement exempt from registration under SEC Rule 144a, and whether it is secured, callable, or 
putable.
10
We obtain firm-level controls from Worldscope.  In particular, we extract data to 
construct firm-level controls that measure firm size (log total assets), return on assets or ROA 
(net income divided by total assets), leverage (total debt divided by total assets).  As the 
literature argues that a firm’s growth opportunity affect the use of covenants (see, e.g. Billett et 
al., 2007), we use two variables to capture growth opportunities.  The first one is R&D expense 
 We also control for the offering amount and maturity.  We use S&P and Moody’s 
bond ratings to create a dummy variable highyield, which equals one if the bond rating is below 
BBB or Baa.  Bond-level characteristics are potentially endogenously determined with covenant 
use; however, in practice our results are unaffected by whether we include these variables in the 
analysis.  
                                                            
10 In the total sample of 1351 bonds, 57 bonds are secured, 48 bonds are putable, 581 bonds are callable, and 603 
bonds are issued under SEC Rule 144a.   13 
(total R&D expenses divided by total assets), the second one is the market-to-book ratio (defined 
as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt divided by total assets).  The data are 
obtained at the end of the quarter prior to the bond issue.  We also include year and one-digit SIC 
industry dummies in all regressions. 
The country level controls include log GDP per capita, inflation, and sovereign rating.  
We measure the overall country risk with Standard & Poor’s sovereign debt ratings, which are 
translated into comprehensive credit ratings with values ranging from 22 (AAA with positive 
outlook) to 0 (C with negative outlook) following the key in Appendix C (see also Gande and 
Parsley, 2007).   
We are able to match about 72% of the bond  issues  with  firm-level data from 
Worldscope.  Our sample size is further reduced because of missing or incomplete firm-level 
information.  After merging with firm-level variables, our sample has 858 bonds issued by 397 
firms from 41 countries. 
 
E. Firm-level Governance, Cross-listing, and Dividends 
Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005), Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007), and Chava, Livdan, 
and Purnanandam (2008)  find that firms  with stronger  firm-level  corporate governance  are 
charged higher rates in the credit market.  Therefore, if strong corporate governance increases the 
agency cost of debt, we expect that firms with strong corporate governance should include more 
restrictive covenants to reduce these agency costs.  We use firm-level corporate governance 
information from the global CGQ database provided by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).  
ISS’s global CQG database contains corporate governance data of more than 1,700 non-U.S. 
companies, dating back to 2003.  We use the average of the firm’s corporate governance index 
from 2003 and 2007 as our measure of governance.  Merging with the ISS data further reduces 14 
our sample to 391 bonds issued by 162 firms from 20 countries.  While this smaller sample is 
comprised of larger firms, the dispersion in our key variables, the creditor rights and shareholder 
rights indices, is still high across all our analyses.
11
                                                            
11 See Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) for a discussion of ISS’s corporate governance index. 
   
The literature shows that cross-listing in regimes with strong investor protection laws 
may reduce the impact of the home country’s legal institutions (see, e.g. Fuerst, 1998; Stulz, 
1999; Coffee 1999).  If this bonding hypothesis also applies for the credit markets, the impact of 
creditor rights and shareholder rights on the use of covenants should be lower for firms which are 
cross-listed in strong legal regime such as the U.S.  We therefore examine whether cross-listing 
affects the relation between the home country’s legal institutions and the use covenants.  The 
cross-listing dummy equals one if a firm’s shares are cross-listed in the U.S., either through an 
ADR program or direct exchange listing, and zero otherwise.  We test the impact of cross-listing 
as well as various interactions between the cross-listing dummy and our key legal variables on 
covenant use.  
Brockman and Unlu (2008) argue that dividend payments substitute for creditor rights in 
reducing the agency cost of debt.  We therefore investigate whether dividend payments impact 
the use of covenants and the relation between legal institutions and covenants.  If dividend 
payments substitute for creditor rights in reducing the agency cost of debt, the impact of creditor 
rights on the use of covenants should be lower for firms which pay dividends.  We add a dummy 
variable, dividend, that equals one if the firm pays dividends, and zero otherwise.  We also test 
various interactions between the dividend dummy and our key legal variables.  
 
II.  Empirical Results 
A. Summary Statistics 15 
Figure 1 provides three graphical views of the average frequency with which any 
covenants are used and the average number of covenants for different years.  The frequency with 
which covenants are used first rises in the early 1990’s, to approximately 85% in 1993, then 
plummets around 2001 or 2002.  Just over 20% of Yankee bond issues in our 2007 sample use 
any covenants.  The number of covenants also increases in the early 1990’s, to an average of 
approximately six in 1998 and then declines afterwards.  This infrequent use of covenants may 
reflect investor myopia as default rates have recently been relatively low.
12
Table II lists means for average frequency of bonds with covenants; the average number 
of covenants used; and selected institutional and country-level variables by country and legal 
origins.  For instance, for firms listed in countries with English legal origin, 60.5% of 410 bonds 
  Panel C of Figure 1 
presents the frequency of different types of covenants.  The trends of all types of covenants over 
time are similar while the frequency of covenants on payment and stock is lower than others.   
In Table I, we report descriptive statistics for our covenant variables.  Just 53% of bonds 
in the sample include some covenants.  The average number of covenants used is 3.12 with a 
maximum number of 15.  Among the eight covenant categories, the most frequently used types 
of restrictions are anti-takeover restrictions (46.3%), asset and investment restrictions (45.7%), 
borrowing restrictions (43.4%), and default-related restrictions (41.8%).  Payment restrictions 
occur 16.2% of the time, and the frequency of stock issuance restrictions is 12.3%.  Profit-
maintenance and rating-related covenants are rarely used, with frequencies of 1.3% and 0.7%, 
respectively.  Panel B of Table I presents the correlation coefficient of various types of covenant 
indices.  Consistent with other papers (e.g. Qi and Wald, 2008), a debt contract which includes 
one type of covenant is more likely to include other types of covenants.   
                                                            
12 The case for such myopic behavior by creditors can partly be seen in the recent credit crunch.  See, for instance, 
the description in Brunnermeier (2008). 16 
include covenants.  In contrast, only 28.6% of the 63 bonds from socialist origin countries use 
any covenants.  We control for legal origin and other country-level and firm-level factors in the 
analysis below.  The three countries with highest frequencies of bond issues are United Kingdom 
(199 issues), Mexico (124 issues) and Brazil (113 issues).  In unreported robustness tests, we 
find that our results are robust to removing these countries from the sample.  
Panel A of Table III provides summary statistics on the variables used in the analysis.  
Our covenant index is negatively correlated with both the creditor rights and the shareholder 
rights indices.  Covenant use is also negatively related to firm size, and this may reflect the 
greater use of covenants by lower rated firms, which are typically smaller (not reported).  We use 
multivariate  regressions to more accurately discern the effects of institutional and firm 
characteristics on covenant use.  
Panel B of Table III provides correlations between our institutional variables.  Creditor 
rights have a positive correlation of 0.37 with the shareholder rights index.  Creditor rights also 
have relatively high positive correlations with measures of public enforcement, effectiveness of 
bankruptcy law, rule of law, and property rights, and negative correlations with public 
information sharing and ownership concentration.  In particular, the correlation between creditor 
rights and property rights is 0.59, and the correlation between creditor rights and ownership 
concentration is -0.62, and we are therefore careful to consider regressions both with and without 
these additional institutional variables, as multicollinearity may be an issue.  Note that the strong 
negative relation between property rights (or creditor rights) and ownership concentration is 
consistent with Li, Moshirian, Phan, and Zein (2006), who document that institutional 
shareholding patterns across countries are determined by macro corporate governance factors 
such as shareholder protection, and law enforcement.  17 
 
B. Legal Institutions and the Overall Use of Covenants  
  Table IV presents our first multivariate regressions, on whether the debt issue includes 
any protective covenants.  Column (1) is a regression on our two institutional variables only, the 
creditor rights and shareholder rights indices; column (2) includes firm characteristics; column 
(3) includes country characteristics; column (4) includes bond issue characteristics, and columns 
(5) and (6) includes other legal/institutional variables.  Overall, these regressions show weak 
evidence of substitution between the creditor rights index and bond covenants; however, as the 
analysis below shows, this is largely due to the imprecision of this particular dependent variable.  
We consider the total number of covenants, and specific classes or individual covenants in the 
analysis below. 
  This initial analysis does suggest that issues subject to greater shareholder rights are more 
likely to include covenants, as the coefficient on the shareholder rights index is significant in all 
the regressions.  The marginal effect of the shareholder rights index is reported as 
Mfx (Shareholder rights index), and a one unit improvement in shareholder rights increases the 
probability of including covenants by 4.7% to 13.9% depending on the specification. 
  Table V provides the results from a Poisson regression, where the dependent variable is 
the covenant index, i.e., the number of protective covenants used.  The columns in Table V again 
provide regressions with just the key institutional variables, with firm characteristics, with 
country characteristics, with other issue characteristics, and lastly with additional 
legal/institutional variables.  Here, we find strong support for the hypothesis that country level 
creditor rights substitute for covenants in bond contracts.  The coefficient on creditor rights is 
significant in all six regressions at the 1% level.  Moreover, we find support for the notion that 
more shareholder-friendly firms may be more subject to bondholder-shareholder agency 18 
problems, and therefore creditors may require more covenants.  Specifically, the coefficient on 
the shareholder rights index is positive and significant in all the regressions, although the 
significance is marginal in the first three regressions. 
  Marginal effects of creditor rights and shareholder rights indices for each regression are 
reported in row Mfx (Creditor rights) and Mfx (Shareholder rights index), respectively.  These 
numbers suggest that creditor rights and shareholder rights indices are economically important in 
determining the use of covenants.  A one unit improvement in the creditor rights index reduces 
the number of covenants used by 22.9% to 43.5%.  A one unit increase in the shareholder rights 
index causes a 20.6% to 33.3% increase in the number of covenants used.  
  Consistent with the agency theory and previous papers (Malitz,  1986;  Begley and 
Feltham, 1999; Nash, Netter, and Poulsen, 2003; and Billett et al., 2007), firms with high agency 
risk are more likely to include more protective covenants.  In particular, we find that small firms 
(low total asset), growth firms (high R&D expense relative to total asset), and high leverage 
firms include more protective covenants in their bond contracts.  Firms with more fixed assets 
(high PPE value relative to total asset) are also more likely to use covenants.  Private placed 
bonds use significantly fewer covenants, and this may reflect alternative sources of monitoring 
by institutional lenders relative to public bondholders as a way to alleviate moral hazard (see, 
Diamond, 1991).  Callable bonds include significantly more covenants.  Consistent with agency 
theory and prior results, high yield bonds include significantly more covenants. 
   We examine other institutional variables with care because these variables are highly 
correlated with creditor and shareholder rights as shown in Table III, and thus multicolinearity 
may be an issue.  We find public enforcement is highly positively related to the covenant index 
suggesting that strong public enforcement laws encourage the use of more restrictive covenants.  19 
Thus, as one might expect, if covenants are easier to enforce, they are more valuable and 
therefore more likely to be used.  Effectiveness of bankruptcy law is also associated with more 
debt covenants, and this may reflect greater value for such covenants with improved bankruptcy 
procedures.  In unreported regressions, we also consider the enforceability of contract, efficient 
outcome of debt enforcement in bankruptcy, and days of bankruptcy enforcement (see, Djankov, 
Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2008).  These law enforcement variables generally show that 
stronger law enforcement encourages the use of covenants.  We find public information sharing 
is significantly negatively related to the use of covenants suggesting that information sharing by 
institutions may serve as a substitute for debt covenants in mitigating moral hazard.  We find that 
a strong rule of law is associated with reductions in the use of covenants.   
 
C. Legal Institutions and the Use of Specific Types of Covenants  
  Table VI provides Poisson regressions on covenant indices of various types, where the 
covenants are categorized into payment restrictions, borrowing restrictions, asset restrictions, 
stock restrictions, default-related, and anti-takeover related covenants (see Table I for further 
details).  We do not study the profit maintenance and rating decline covenant indices because 
these two types of covenants are very rarely used.  In all cases, creditor rights are significantly 
negatively related to the use of each of these types of covenants.  The shareholder rights index is 
significantly positively related to several types of covenants; specifically, to borrowing, asset, 
default, and anti-takeover restrictions.  In unreported regressions, we run a similar analysis on 
dummy variables for whether any covenants in each class are included in the deal, as well as 
checking whether the results are impacted by excluding other institutional variables, bond-level 
controls, or country-level controls; we find similar results.   20 
We compare the marginal effects of creditor rights and shareholder rights indices in 
determining the use of each type of covenants.  We find that shareholder rights are relatively 
more important than creditor rights in determining the use of default related covenants.  The 
marginal effect of shareholder rights index is 7.8% compared to -4.2% for the creditor rights 
index.  The shareholder rights index is also slightly more important in the use of anti-takeover 
covenants, although, as discussed below, the individual antitakeover covenants are not similarly 
impacted by these laws.  
The shareholder rights index is also more important than the creditor rights index in 
determining the use of asset and investment related covenants, possibly reflecting creditors’ 
concerns about potential risk-shifting or other stockholder-bondholder conflicts for firms 
embedded with strong shareholder rights.  The creditor rights index is relatively more important 
in the use of payment restriction covenants and borrowing restriction covenants as shown in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table VI.  It is interesting to note that shareholder rights are negative 
although insignificantly related to the use of stock issuance restriction covenants.  Detailed study 
of individual covenant in Table VII below provides more information on this issue.  
 
D. Legal Institutions and the Use of Individual Covenants  
Table VII further presents probit regressions for each of the 16 most commonly used 
individual covenants.  We only study those covenants used in at least 5% of bond issues (as 
shown in Table I).  Consistent with our prior results, firms subject to higher creditor rights are 
less likely to include most types of covenants while firms with strong shareholder rights are more 
likely to use most types of covenant.  Economically, the most significant impact is on negative 
pledge covenants (i.e., restrictions on the issuance of secured debt; column 3), asset sale 21 
restrictions (column 13), consolidation merge restrictions (column 15), and cross-default 
acceleration covenants (column 16).  
  The individual covenant regressions provide a more detailed picture of how the 
shareholder rights index impacts covenant use.  Columns (1) and (2) study the two types of 
payment restrictive covenants.  In contrast to the results reported in Table VI, we find both 
creditor rights and shareholders rights significantly impact the use of payment restriction 
covenants.  As for the borrowing restriction covenants (columns 3 to 8), both creditor rights and 
shareholder rights are significantly related to three of the six borrowing restrictions.   
Columns (9) and (10) of Table VII report the regression results for the two stock issuance 
covenants.  Consistent with the findings in Table VI, we show that the shareholder rights index is 
significantly negatively related to subsidiary stock issuance restrictions.  We believe that this 
finding reflect the shareholder-bondholder alignment in term of stock issuance.  Minority 
shareholders are unwilling to issue new stocks that dilute existing shareholders.  Therefore, 
stronger shareholder rights protection is negatively related to covenants restricting stock 
issuance.  However, the marginal effect for the stock  issuance covenants is almost zero, 
suggesting that the economic impact of this variable is small.   
  We find creditor rights are significantly negatively related to the restriction on issuer’s 
transaction with subsidiaries and covenants on asset sale (columns 11 and 12).  The shareholders 
rights index is significantly positively related to the restriction on issuer’s transaction with 
subsidiaries and restriction on issuer’s asset sales (columns 11 and 12).  Consistent with 
Table VI, shareholder rights are relatively more important in terms of the economic impact for 
these variables.  Kahan and Klauser (1993) discuss how change of control put provisions, i.e., 
poison puts, may provide more entrenchment of managers than creditor protection.  Firms with 22 
stronger shareholder rights may therefore avoid this particular type of covenant as this 
entrenchment may harm minority holders.  Unlike the significant positive coefficients on 
shareholder rights for most covenants, the coefficient on shareholder rights is not significant for 
poison puts, which is consistent with these covenants having a potentially negative impact on 
shareholders (column 14).  The coefficient on shareholder rights for the more general 
consolidation/merger restriction is positive and significant (column 15), although Kahan and 
Klauser (1993) suggest this restriction have relatively little economic impact.  The shareholder 
rights index is also important in determining the use of cross-default acceleration covenants 
(column 16).  These results are consistent with cross-default covenants addressing a potential 
shareholder-bondholder agency problem that may increase for firms with stronger shareholder 
rights.  
 
E. Individual Components of Creditor Rights and Shareholder Rights  
  Panel A of Table VIII breaks down the creditor rights index into its components, and 
considers them jointly in column (1) and individually in columns (2) through (5).  While the 
individual creditor rights components appear to have a negative relation with covenant use, by 
far the strongest relation, and the only one that is significant when all are considered together, is 
with whether secured creditors are paid first.  Thus of the five creditor rights, the one that 
appears to have the greatest impact is whether secured creditors are paid first.   
Similarly, Panel B of Table VIII breaks down the shareholder rights index into its 
components.  Considered individually, several of the shareholder rights components have a 
significant impact, but when all are considered together (in column 1), only preemptive rights 
has a significant impact on the use of covenants.  Without preemptive rights, majority 
shareholders can expropriate minority shareholders by offering shares to related parties (or to 23 
themselves) at below-market prices.  Thus, the analysis suggests that preemptive rights may be 
the index component that most reduces entrenchment by a controlling group.  As we hypothesize 
above, this reduction in the “quiet life” appears to be associated with an increase in the 
shareholder-bondholder agency conflict.   
 
F. Firm-level Corporate Governance 
We suggest that greater shareholder rights laws are positively related to the use of bond 
contracts because they imply a more active management which increases the potential for 
stockholder-bondholder conflicts.  This implies that firm-level improvements in governance (that 
is, closer alignment of stockholders’ and managers’ interests) may also imply an increase in 
stockholder-bondholder conflicts and therefore greater covenant use.  In Table IX, we therefore 
add controls for firm-level corporate governance.  Although including firm-level governance 
reduces our sample to 391 observations, the sample still has 162 firms from 20 countries.  
Because of the smaller sample, we exclude other institutional variables and bond characteristics 
from these regressions.   
After controlling for firm-level governance, the coefficients on creditor rights and 
shareholder rights are very similar to those from our previous regressions.  Interestingly, firm-
level corporate governance is positively related to the use of most types of covenants.  This 
echoes our main finding that stronger shareholder rights may increase the stockholder-
bondholder conflict, and therefore increase the use of covenants.  This finding is also consistent 
with Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2006) and Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2008) who find 
that firms that are more open to the corporate control market are punished in credit markets.  The 
results in Table IX also suggest that, economically, country-level shareholder rights laws are 
more important than firm-level governance in shaping the use of covenants.  This result is 24 
consistent with Doidge et al. (2007), who find that country-level protection matters more than 
firm-level characteristics. 
 
III. Robustness, Cross-listing, and Dividends  
We consider a number of additional tests to ensure the robustness of our findings.  
Specifically, we examine the robustness of our results to alternative measures of shareholder 
rights and creditor rights, to the inclusion of legal origin variables, and to various sub-samples. 
Table X reports robustness tests.  In Panel A, we consider the anti-self dealing index as 
an alternative to the shareholder rights index.  The anti-self dealing index is positively related to 
most types of covenants although it is statistically insignificant.  Consistent with our finding in 
Table V, the anti-self dealing index is significantly positively related to the use of default 
covenants and negatively related to the use of stock issuance covenants.   
In Panel B of Table X, we control for legal origin dummies as well as creditor rights and 
shareholder rights.  The results show that firms from English origin countries (the benchmark) 
are more likely to include covenants than those from other legal origins.  German and 
Scandinavian origin firms use significantly fewer covenants than English origin firms whereas 
French and Socialist origin firms are not statistically different from English origin firms.   
  Since our creditor and shareholder rights are country-level variables, unknown country-
level factors may cause the errors to be correlated among bonds issued from same country.  In 
Panel C of Table X, we redo our estimation using a sample with only one bond from each firm 
and we correct the standard errors for clustering by country.  This method allows us to correct for 
potential correlation among bonds within a country while avoiding the correlation of bonds from 
the same firm.  As shown in the Panel C of Table X, our results are robust when this approach is 
used.  25 
In unreported regressions, we also  use Spamann’s anti-director index as a further 
robustness check, and we find it provides similar results as our shareholder rights index.  
Additionally, we exclude bonds from a country with high frequencies of bond issues (i.e., U.K., 
Mexico, and Brazil) to check whether our results are driven by one particular country.  We drop 
bonds issued after 2003 since our creditor rights index is time-varying up to 2003 and we 
assumed that it is unchanged after that.  We drop bonds issued by financial companies because 
these companies usually use fewer covenants.  We also check the robustness of our results to 
excluding private placement bonds.  Our results are not affected when using these sub-samples.  
In further unreported regressions, we study whether cross-listing in the U.S. stock market 
(i.e., either via an ADR or through direct listing on U.S. stock exchanges) reduces the impact of 
the home country’s legal institutions by bonding firms to a stronger U.S. legal regime.  We 
include a cross-listing dummy and an interaction between the cross-listing dummy and both 
creditor rights and shareholder rights indices in our baseline specification.  However, we find no 
evidence to support the bonding hypothesis for creditors.   
We also study whether dividend payments can substitute for creditor rights in reducing 
the agency cost of debt (see Brockman and Unlu, 2008).  We include a dividend payment 
dummy equal to one if a firm pays dividends and interactions of this dividend dummy with 
creditor rights and shareholder rights indices.  We find no significant empirical results for either 
the dividend dummy or these interactions, and thus no evidence that dividend payments reduce 
the agency problems mitigated by covenants.  Note that paying dividends may have several 
impacts regarding these contracting problems.  Dividend payments may be associated with a 
reduction in information asymmetry or closer monitoring of management.  Alternatively, they 
may also reflect a greater willingness to expropriate wealth from bondholders, after all, there are 26 
covenants specifically restricting such payments.  Thus, the insignificant impact of dividends on 
covenant use may reflect these mixed effects. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
We use a sample of bonds issued by foreign firms in the U.S. to study how cross-country 
differences in statutory investor protection affect the use of bond covenants.  These covenants 
are used to mitigate the agency costs arising from conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders.  Our findings suggest that laws protecting creditors and shareholders’ significantly 
impact the number and types of restrictive debt covenants.  Specifically, stronger home-country 
creditor protection laws substitute for covenants in Yankee bonds.  Given the costly contracting 
hypothesis, stronger creditor protection laws may reduce bondholder-stockholder agency 
problems without requiring explicit covenants.  This finding shows how creditor protection could 
then reduce the cost of debt (as found by Qian and Strahan, 2007, and Bae and Goyal, 2008), 
while creating more opportunities for higher leverage (as found by Djankov et al., 2007).  
On the other hand, we find that the shareholder rights index and a firm-level governance 
measure are both positively associated with the use of most covenants.  Thus, a better alignment 
of stockholder-manager interests may increase the likelihood of stockholder-bondholder 
conflicts.  This result is consistent with the lower cost of debt for U.S. firms with worse 
governance found by Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005), Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007), and 
Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2008).  However, greater shareholder rights are not associated 
with the use of more restrictions on equity issuance, as firms whose minority equity protection 
would already avoid such equity dilution. 27 
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Table I 
Types of Covenants 
 
This table presents summary statistics of various covenants included in foreign bonds issued in the U.S. (Yankee 
bonds).  Panel A presents the mean, standard deviation, and other descriptive statistics.  Panel B reports correlations.  
The data are from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) and the sample period is 1991 to 2007.  FISD 
provides more than 50 variables on bondholder protection, restrictions on issuers, and restrictions on subsidiaries.  
Since typically there are multiple variables for one type of restricted activity, we group FISD variables into 22 
covenant dummies that indicate whether a specified activity is restricted or not.  For example, dividend payments 
equals one if there is a covenant limiting dividend payments of the issuer or the subsidiary, and zero otherwise.  We 
sum these 22 dummies to compute the Covenants index, which measures the total number of covenants used.  A 
higher score indicates stronger creditor protection via bond covenants.  Covenant dummy is a variable equals one if 
any covenants is used, zero otherwise.  We further classify the 22 covenant dummies into eight major categories 
according to the type of restricted activities.  We create covenant indices for each of these eight categories by 
summing the covenant dummies within each category.  For each category, we also create a dummy variable that 
indicates whether any covenants related to that category are included.  Appendix B provides detailed descriptions of 
individual covenants.  Correlation coefficients in bold are significant at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 
Covenants  Corresponding variable in FISD  Mean  S.D.  Max 
Total covenants         
Covenant dummy    53.00%  0.50  1 
Covenant index    3.12  4.00  15 
Payment restrictions         
Payment dummy    16.21%  0.37  1 
Payment index    0.30  0.70  2 
Dividend payment  Total  14.73%  0.35  1 
  Isu_dividends_related_payments   0.59%  0.08  1 
  Sub_dividends_related_payments   14.36%  0.35  1 
Other payment   Isu_restricted_payments   15.47%  0.36  1 
Borrowing restrictions         
Borrowing dummy    43.38%  0.50  1 
Borrowing index    0.94  1.26  5 
Funded debt  Total  0.15%  0.04  1 
  Isu_funded_debt   0.15%  0.04  1 
  Sub_funded_debt   0.00%  0.00  1 
Subordinate debt   Isu_subordinated_debt_issuance   0.81%  0.09  1 
Senior debt   Isu_senior_debt_issuance   0.15%  0.04  1 
Secured debt   Negative_pledge_covenant  39.90%  0.49  1 
Indebtedness  Total  18.58%  0.39  1 
  Isu_indebteness   17.91%  0.38  1 
  Sub_indebteness   16.58%  0.37  1 
  Isu_leverage_test  0.22%  0.05  1 
  Sub_leverage_test  0.07%  0.03  1 
Leaseback  Total  23.83%  0.43  1 
  Isu_leaseback   23.61%  0.42  1 
  Sub_sales_leaseback   21.98%  0.41  1 
Liens  Total  2.37%  0.15  1 
  Isu_liens   2.22%  0.15  1 
  Sub_liens   2.15%  0.14  1 
Guarantees  Sub_guarantees  7.99%  0.27  1 31 
Asset restrictions         
Asset dummy    45.74%  0.50  1 
Asset index    0.18  0.53  3 
Transactions  Isu_transaction_affiliates   16.21%  0.37  1 
Investments  Total  2.07%  0.14  1 
  Isu_investments   1.85%  0.13  1 
  Sub_investments_unrestricted   0.81%  0.09  1 
Asset sales  Total  45.45%  0.50  1 
  Asset_sale_clause   12.29%  0.33  1 
  Isu_sale_assets   45.08%  0.50  1 
   Sub_sale_assets_unrestricted   0.07%  0.03  1 
Stock issuance restrictions         
Stock dummy    12.29%  0.33  1 
Stock index    0.64  0.79  3 
Common stock   Total  8.59%  0.28  1 
  Isu_stock_issuance_issuer   1.85%  0.13  1 
  Sub_stock_issuance   8.22%  0.27  1 
Preferred stock  Sub_preferred_stock_issuance   3.85%  0.19  1 
Other stock  Isu_stock_transfer_sale   5.77%  0.23  1 
Default restrictions         
Default dummy    41.75%  0.49  1 
Default index    0.42  0.49  2 
Cross default  Total  41.75%  0.49  1 
  Cross_acceleration   39.01%  0.49  1 
   Cross_default   2.81%  0.17  1 
Anti-takeover restrictions         
Anti-takeover dummy    46.34%  0.50  1 
Anti-takeover index    0.62  0.74  2 
Poison put  Change_control_put_provisions   17.02%  0.38  1 
Merger  Isu_consolidation_merger   45.15%  0.50  1 
Profit/net-worth restrictions       
Profit dummy    1.26%  0.11  1 
Profit index    0.01  0.11  1 
Earnings   Total  0.07%  0.03  1 
  Isu_fixed_charge_coverage   0.07%  0.03  1 
  Sub_fixed_charge_coverage   0.00%  0.00  1 
  Isu_net_earnings_test_issuance   0.00%  0.00  1 
Net worth  Total       
  Isu_maintenance_net_worth   1.18%  0.11  1 
  Declining_net_worth   0.00%  0.00  1 
Rating decline restrictions         
Rating trigger dummy    0.67%  0.08  1 
Rating trigger index    0.01  0.08  1 




Panel B: Correlations of the use of covenants 
 
  Payment  Borrowing  Asset  Stock  Default  Anti-takeover  Profit 
Payment  1.00             
Borrowing  0.76  1.00           
Asset  0.75  0.84  1.00         
Stock  0.75  0.63  0.57  1.00       
Default  0.47  0.72  0.68  0.37  1.00     
Anti-takeover  0.71  0.85  0.92  0.56  0.69  1.00   
Profit  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.02  0.08  1.00 





Covenants and Investor Protection across Countries and Legal Origins 
 
This table presents data on the use of covenants, the number of covenants used (i.e. the covenant index), and the 
country-level investor protection institutions across countries and legal origins.    The  covenants data and bond 
information are from FISD.  The sample period is 1991 to 2007.  All variables are described in Appendix A. 
 
















English origin               
Australia  61  42.6%  2.1  3.0  4.0  20.1  20,178 
Canada  21  61.9%  5.3  1.0  4.0  20.1  22,340 
Hong Kong  34  52.9%  3.4  4.0  5.0  17.0  25,502 
India  13  61.5%  2.0  2.0  5.0  11.4  458 
Ireland  9  66.7%  4.3  1.0  5.0  20.4  25,695 
Israel  4  50.0%  6.0  3.0  4.0  15.3  19,711 
Jamaica  4  0.0%  0.0  2.0  4.0  7.0  3,150 
Malaysia  15  40.0%  2.0  3.0  5.0  16.1  4,188 
New Zealand  3  100.0%  4.0  4.0  4.0  19.7  13,169 
Saudi Arabia  1  0.0%  0.0  3.0  na  16.0  8,669 
Singapore  35  62.9%  4.9  3.0  5.0  21.0  22,298 
South Africa  3  0.0%  0.0  3.0  5.0  12.7  3,370 
Thailand  8  50.0%  2.9  2.5  4.0  14.6  2,198 
United Kingdom  199  70.4%  3.8  4.0  5.0  21.0  24,330 
Total  410  60.5%  3.5  3.4  4.8  19.6  21,113 
French origin 
     
   
   
Argentina  33  63.6%  5.1  1.0  2.0  9.1  7,735 
Belgium  2  0.0%  0.0  2.0  3.0  20.0  22,116 
Brazil  113  53.1%  2.9  1.0  5.0  8.9  3,467 
Chile  48  50.0%  2.4  2.0  4.0  15.4  5,099 
Colombia  8  25.0%  1.4  0.0  3.0  11.4  2,289 
Dominican Republic  2  0.0%  0.0  2.0  na  8.0  2,755 
Ecuador  1  100.0%  12.0  0.0  2.0  .  1,361 
Egypt  6  16.7%  1.2  2.0  3.0  11.2  1,574 
El Salvador  1  0.0%  0.0  3.0  2.0  11.0  2,204 
France  49  63.3%  4.4  0.0  3.5  21.0  22,413 
Greece  7  57.1%  4.3  1.0  2.0  15.7  11,456 
Guatemala  1  0.0%  0.0  1.0  na  9.0  1,803 
Indonesia  18  50.0%  4.2  2.4  4.0  9.5  823 
Italy  20  60.0%  2.2  2.0  2.0  17.8  18,953 
Jordan  1  0.0%  0.0  1.0  1.0  10.0  1,774 
Kuwait  1  0.0%  0.0  3.0  na  16.0  17,498 
Lebanon  2  0.0%  0.0  4.0  na  6.5  4,767 
Mexico  124  62.9%  5.0  0.0  3.0  11.4  5,619 
Netherlands  76  55.3%  3.7  3.0  2.5  21.0  22,561 
Panama  2  100.0%  3.5  4.0  2.0  10.5  4,238 
Philippines  15  66.7%  5.3  1.0  4.0  10.7  937 
Portugal  2  100.0%  3.0  1.0  2.5  18.5  9,677 
Spain  66  54.6%  1.9  2.0  5.0  20.3  14,687 
Turkey  6  16.7%  0.3  2.0  3.0  8.2  3,156 
Venezuela  18  83.3%  0.9  3.0  1.0  7.4  5,325 
Total  622  56.4%  3.5  1.3  3.5  14.1  9,828 34 
German origin 
     
   
   
Austria  2  0.0%  0.0  3.0  2.5  21.0  24,604 
Germany  70  27.1%  1.1  3.0  3.5  21.0  22,763 
Japan  29  44.8%  1.3  1.8  4.5  19.9  37,360 
Korea, Republic  63  42.9%  1.9  3.0  4.5  16.1  11,102 
Switzerland  24  16.7%  0.8  1.0  3.0  21.0  33,325 
Taiwan  1  0.0%  0.0  2.0  3.0  17.0  15,647 
Total  189  33.3%  1.3  2.6  3.9  19.2  22,439 
Socialist origin 
     
   
   
China  10  60.0%  3.8  2.0  1.0  13.7  937 
Czech Republic  3  33.3%  1.7  3.0  4.0  15.7  5,366 
Kazakhstan  15  6.7%  0.5  2.1  4.0  11.6  1,833 
Poland  9  77.8%  7.2  1.0  2.0  13.3  4,051 
Russian Federal  25  12.0%  0.6  1.9  4.0  10.6  2,225 
Ukraine  1  0.0%  0.0  2.0  3.0  7.0  824 
Total  63  28.6%  2.1  1.9  3.2  11.9  2,316 
Scandinavian origin 
     
   
   
Denmark  4  0.0%  0.0  3.0  4.0  20.5  29,577 
Finland  5  40.0%  2.0  1.0  3.5  20.0  22,619 
Norway  30  66.7%  3.4  2.0  3.5  21.0  37,020 
Sweden  26  46.2%  4.5  1.2  3.5  20.3  25,423 






Panel A shows summary statistics; Panel B reports correlations of institutional variables.  All variables are described 
in Appendix A.  The sample period is 1991 to 2007.  Correlation coefficients in bold are significant at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 
Variables  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max  Obs. 
Key institutional variables           
Creditor rights index  2.16  1.31  0.00  4.00  1,349 
Shareholder rights index   3.94  1.04  1.00  5.00  1,342 
Component of creditor rights index           
Restriction on reorganization (CR1)  0.29  0.46  0.00  1.00  1,349 
No automatic asset freeze (CR2)  0.62  0.49  0.00  1.00  1,349 
Secured creditor paid first (CR3)  0.67  0.47  0.00  1.00  1,349 
Management does not stay (CR4)  0.58  0.49  0.00  1.00  1,349 
Component of shareholder rights index           
Vote by mail (SR1)  0.60  0.49  0.00  1.00  1,342 
Shares not deposited (SR2)  0.59  0.49  0.00  1.00  1,342 
Cumulative voting (SR3)  0.29  0.46  0.00  1.00  1,342 
Oppressed minorities (SR4)  0.61  0.42  0.00  1.00  1,342 
Preemptive rights (SR5)  0.89  0.32  0.00  1.00  1,342 
Percentage capital to call meeting (SR6)  0.08  0.03  0.03  0.25  1,327 
Alternative measure of key variables           
Spamann Anti-director index    3.93  0.91  2.00  5.00  1,254 
Anti-self dealing index  0.51  0.29  0.08  1.00  1,342 
Other institutional variables           
Public enforcement index  0.51  0.23  0.00  0.90  1,272 
Enforceability of contract  6.70  1.54  4.29  8.94  1,270 
Efficiency of bankruptcy  67.37  27.68  6.60  96.10  1,336 
Log (Days of contract enforcement)  5.42  0.78  3.87  7.29  1,349 
Public information sharing   0.35  0.48  0.00  1.00  1,351 
Effectiveness of bankruptcy law  5.40  1.04  2.70  6.60  1,330 
Rule of law  0.87  0.99  -1.09  1.99  1,349 
Property rights  72.83  19.68  30.00  90.00  1,270 
Ownership concentration   0.42  0.15  0.18  0.67  1,272 
Country characteristics                
Sovereign rating  16.69  4.89  0.00  21.00  1,346 
Log (GDP / capita)  9.29  1.01  5.93  10.62  1,349 
Inflation  9.76  101.83  -6.18  2239.13  1,349 
Firm characteristics                
Log (Total asset)  16.78  2.06  8.30  21.37  1,026 
ROA  4.62  7.62  -23.53  45.00  971 
R&D / Total asset  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09  1,351 
PPE / Total asset  0.35  0.28  0.00  0.92  1,015 
Market to book ratio  2.12  4.00  0.15  33.90  923 
Leverage  0.35  0.18  0.01  0.92  1,021 
Corporate governance index  65.56  22.83  2.80  97.72  441 
Dividend (dummy)  0.55  0.50  0.00  1.00  1,351 
Cross-listing (dummy)  0.18  0.38  0.00  1.00  1,351 
Bond characteristics                 
Log (Issue size)  12.63  0.92  0.00  15.20  1,351 
Log (Maturity)  7.98  0.67  5.24  10.51  1,336 
Private issue  0.45  0.50  0.00  1.00  1,351 
Callable bond  0.43  0.50  0.00  1.00  1,351 
Putable bond  0.04  0.19  0.00  1.00  1,350 
Secured bond  0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00  1,351 
Highyield bond  0.35  0.48  0.00  1.00  1,351 36 
Panel B: Correlations of institutional variables 
 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Creditor right index  (1)  1.00                       
Shareholder rights index  (2)  0.37  1.00                     
Spamann Anti-director index   (3)  0.22  0.62  1.00                   
Anti-self dealing index  (4)  0.68  0.59  0.24  1.00                 
Public enforcement index  (5)  0.32  0.38  0.28  0.66  1.00               
Enforceability of contract  (6)  0.60  0.22  0.20  0.45  0.16  1.00             
Efficiency of bankruptcy  (7)  0.44  0.17  -0.10  0.44  0.04  0.66  1.00           
Log (days of contract enforcement)  (8)  -0.25  0.00  -0.31  -0.04  0.08  -0.48  -0.58  1.00         
Public information sharing  (9)  -0.22  -0.09  0.32  -0.30  -0.07  -0.38  -0.65  0.25  1.00       
Effectiveness of bankruptcy law  (10)  0.56  0.28  0.25  0.52  0.29  0.93  0.68  -0.51  -0.35  1.00     
Rule of law  (11)  0.55  0.24  0.36  0.46  0.22  0.90  0.71  -0.60  -0.22  0.91  1.00   
Property rights  (12)  0.59  0.23  0.27  0.48  0.21  0.81  0.67  -0.53  -0.24  0.84  0.91  1.00 





Legal Institutions and the Use of Covenants 
 
This table provides Probit regression estimates of whether any protective covenants are used on creditor rights and 
shareholder rights.  All variables are described in Appendix A, and the sample period is 1991 to 2007.  All 
regressions include year and one-digit industry dummy variables.  Standard errors are robust and corrected for 
clustering by firm; the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  a, b, and c denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Mfx (Creditor rights index) and Mfx (Shareholder rights index) measure marginal 
effects of a one-unit change of either index on the probability of including any covenants in bond contracts. 
 
  Covenant dummy 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Creditor rights index  0.025  -0.059  -0.089  -0.045  -0.152
a  -0.087 
  (0.55)  (-1.16)  (-1.52)  (-0.58)  (-1.86)  (-0.83) 







   (1.92)  (3.09)  (3.22)  (3.97)  (3.34)  (3.44) 
Public enforcement index          1.412
c  1.630
c 
          (3.73)  (3.76) 
Public information sharing          -0.509
c  -0.449
b 
          (-2.69)  (-2.20) 
Effectiveness of bankruptcy law            0.087 
            (0.41) 
Rule and law             -1.193
c 
                  (-3.03) 
Log (Total asset)    0.119
c  0.110
c  0.034  0.161
b  0.170
c 
    (2.98)  (2.71)  (0.58)  (2.54)  (2.69) 
ROA    0.000  0.002  -0.003  -0.001  0.000 
    (-0.019)  (0.22)  (-0.35)  (-0.11)  (-0.013) 
R&D / Total asset    0.763  -0.115  1.232  5.563  5.933 
    (0.15)  (-0.022)  (0.25)  (1.09)  (1.11) 
PPE / Total asset    -0.023  0.027  0.346  0.375  0.261 
    (-0.072)  (0.081)  (0.89)  (0.95)  (0.64) 
Market to book ratio     0.021  0.022  0.035  0.029  0.033 
    (1.17)  (1.15)  (1.54)  (1.24)  (1.43) 
Leverage    -0.351  -0.393  -0.317  0.29  0.377 
      (-0.90)  (-1.00)  (-0.67)  (0.60)  (0.76) 
Sovereign rating      0.009  -0.015  -0.047  0.086 
      (0.30)  (-0.38)  (-1.16)  (1.36) 
Log (GDP / capita)      0.047  -0.051  -0.028  0.131 
      (0.39)  (-0.29)  (-0.16)  (0.64) 
Inflation      -0.001  -0.023  -0.021  -0.026 
         (-0.090)  (-1.50)  (-1.31)  (-1.55) 




        (3.67)  (3.18)  (2.71) 
Log (Maturity)        0.079  0.063  0.086 
        (0.64)  (0.52)  (0.75) 




        (-10.6)  (-11.3)  (-11.2) 




        (3.03)  (2.90)  (2.91) 
Putable bond        0.397  0.482  0.381 
        (1.11)  (1.19)  (0.96) 
Secured bond        0.549  0.788
b  0.930
c 
        (1.50)  (2.28)  (2.60) 




            (2.30)  (2.02)  (1.80) 
Mfx (Credit rights index)  1.00%  -2.30%  -3.50%  -1.70%  -5.80%  -2.60% 
Mfx (Shareholder rights index)  4.70%  8.90%  9.40%  14.00%  12.60%  13.40% 
Observations  1,303  850  849  821  805  785 
Number of firms  639  395  395  382  370  364 
Log Likelihood   -705.5  -445  -444.1  -290.9  -270.8  -262.7 38 
 
Table V 
Legal Institutions and the Number of Bond Covenants 
 
This table provides Poisson regression estimates of the covenants index (the number of protective covenants) on 
creditor rights and shareholder rights.  All variables are described in Appendix A, and the sample period is 1991 to 
2007.  All  regressions  include year and one-digit industry dummy variables.  Standard errors are robust and 
corrected for clustering by firm; the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  a, b, and c denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   Mfx (Creditor rights index)  and Mfx (Shareholder rights index) 
measure marginal effects of a one-unit change of either index on the number of covenants in bond contracts. 
 
  Covenant index 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 







  (2.84)  (3.16)  (3.70)  (3.03)  (3.92)  (3.15) 







   (1.68)  (1.90)  (1.90)  (3.76)  (2.88)  (2.73) 
Public enforcement index          0.741
c  0.872
c 
          (3.76)  (4.06) 
Public information sharing          -0.194
b  -0.133 
          (2.42)  (1.64) 
Effectiveness of bankruptcy law            0.199
a 
            (1.75) 
Rule and law             -0.67
c 
                 (4.26) 
Log (Total asset)    -0.081
c  -0.094
c  -0.033  0.014  0.013 
    (2.82)  (3.23)  (1.04)  (0.50)  (0.49) 
ROA    0.006  0.007  0.004  0.005  0.006 
    (0.71)  (0.94)  (0.99)  (1.13)  (1.22) 
R&D / Total asset    2.386  0.768  2.461  3.859
b  3.855
a 
    (0.78)  (0.25)  (1.22)  (2.00)  (1.77) 




    (1.12)  (1.34)  (2.63)  (2.69)  (2.46) 
Market to book ratio     -0.009  -0.007  -0.004  -0.009  -0.005 
    (1.22)  (0.71)  (0.64)  (1.27)  (0.62) 
Leverage    0.521
b  0.449
a  0.26  0.507
b  0.558
c 
      (2.01)  (1.71)  (1.32)  (2.59)  (2.80) 
Sovereign rating      0.034  0.043
c  0.02  0.084
c 
      (1.49)  (2.66)  (1.13)  (3.83) 
Log (GDP / capita)      -0.037  -0.117
a  -0.072  0.044 
      (0.43)  (1.80)  (0.99)  (0.49) 
Inflation      0.006  0.000  0.003  -0.001 
         (0.62)  (0.01)  (0.44)  (0.10) 
Log (issue size)        0.038  0.034  -0.001 
        (0.81)  (0.72)  (0.03) 
Log (maturity)        0.023  0.02  0.055 
        (0.42)  (0.40)  (1.19) 




        (7.75)  (8.10)  (8.16) 




        (4.42)  (4.60)  (4.26) 
Putable bond        0.193  0.215  0.217 
        (1.33)  (1.58)  (1.48) 
Secured bond        0.076  0.137  0.062 
        (0.49)  (0.84)  (0.35) 




            (6.30)  (5.25)  (4.47) 
Mfx (Credit rights index)  -22.86%  -28.77%  -38.34%  -23.39%  -29.46%  -24.33% 
Mfx (Shareholder rights index)  20.60%  22.39%  23.76%  32.64%  26.63%  27.85% 
Observations  1,303  858  857  843  827  827 
Number of firms  639  397  397  388  376  376 
Log Likelihood   -3553.7  -2134.7  -2124.6  -1692.3  -1626.5  -1603.6 39 
 40 
Table VI 
Institutional Investor Protection and the Use of Various Types of Covenants 
 
This table provides Poisson regression estimates of the sub-category covenants indices (the number of covenants 
related to a specific type of protection) on creditor rights and shareholder rights.  Covenant classifications are 
reported in Appendix B, all other variables are described in Appendix A, and the sample period is 1991 to 2007.  
Covenants used in at least 5% of bond issues are considered only.  All regressions include year and one-digit 
industry dummy variables.  Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering by firm; the associated t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses.  a, b, and c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
Mfx (Creditor rights index) and Mfx (Shareholder rights index) measure marginal effects of a one-unit change of 
either index on the dependent variable. 
 
  Covenant index 
  Payment  Borrowing  Asset  Stock  Default  Anti-takeover 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 







  (3.15)  (3.18)  (1.67)  (2.70)  (3.05)  (1.84) 
Shareholder rights index   0.205  0.097
a  0.169
b  -0.276  0.264
c  0.100
a 
   (1.53)  (1.77)  (2.58)  (1.22)  (4.01)  (1.84) 







  (2.31)  (3.20)  (4.34)  (1.71)  (2.41)  (4.25) 
Public information sharing  -0.504
a  -0.059  -0.07  -0.087  -0.106  -0.258
c 
  (1.92)  (0.62)  (0.69)  (0.29)  (1.04)  (2.69) 
Effectiveness of bankruptcy law  -0.411  0.234  0.131  2.156
c  0.142  0.081 
  (1.25)  (1.61)  (0.96)  (3.66)  (1.01)  (0.68) 







   (2.02)  (3.38)  (3.49)  (3.80)  (2.46)  (4.48) 







  (1.95)  (1.88)  (1.90)  (2.47)  (1.73)  (1.90) 
ROA  0.016  0.014
b  0.003  0.015  -0.002  0.002 
  (1.33)  (2.20)  (0.60)  (1.33)  (0.34)  (0.51) 
R&D / Total asset  14.692
b  4.525  2.973  9.912  -1.136  2.88 
  (2.56)  (1.55)  (1.11)  (0.88)  (0.21)  (1.10) 
PPE / Total asset  0.824
b  0.844
c  0.102  0.509  0.470
b  0.215 
  (2.01)  (3.81)  (0.54)  (0.89)  (1.97)  (1.28) 
Market to book ratio   -0.047
b  -0.008  -0.001  -0.046
a  0.027
b  0.002 





a  0.014  0.390
a 
   (3.06)  (2.63)  (2.21)  (1.89)  (0.05)  (1.82) 




a  0.027  0.092
c 
  (4.01)  (2.78)  (1.72)  (1.65)  (1.02)  (3.86) 
Log (GDP / capita)  0.124  0.025  0.134  -0.169  0.026  0.082 
  (0.70)  (0.25)  (1.28)  (0.74)  (0.23)  (0.86) 
Inflation  0.021  -0.006  0.006  -0.047  -0.005  0.001 
   (1.40)  (0.49)  (0.62)  (1.53)  (0.51)  (0.08) 
Log (issue size)  -0.251
b  -0.007  0.03  -0.199  0.019  0.073 
  (2.08)  (0.13)  (0.57)  (1.22)  (0.30)  (1.43) 
Log (maturity)  -0.22  -0.043  0.157
b  -0.335  0.000  0.155
c 
  (1.45)  (0.75)  (2.55)  (1.61)  (0.01)  (2.79) 







  (3.13)  (8.19)  (8.22)  (2.35)  (7.34)  (8.74) 




b  0.082  0.258
c 
  (2.87)  (2.98)  (3.01)  (2.59)  (0.99)  (3.54) 
Putable bond  0.052  0.287
a  0.275  0.431  0.026  0.21
a 
  (0.06)  (1.84)  (1.52)  (0.60)  (0.18)  (1.70) 
Secured bond  0.588
a  -0.228  0.173  0.309  0.088  0.107 
  (1.87)  (1.13)  (0.75)  (0.69)  (0.56)  (0.63) 




c  0.138  0.395
c 
   (4.16)  (3.12)  (3.28)  (2.77)  (1.13)  (3.69) 
Mfx (Credit rights index)  -0.96%  -6.96%  -3.55%  -0.32%  -4.15%  -3.46% 
Mfx (Shareholder rights index)  0.75%  4.89%  8.04%  0.27%  7.51%  4.65% 
Observations  827  827  827  827  827  827 
Number of firms  376  376  376  376  376  376 
Log Likelihood   -279.2  -769.3  -690.7  -176.9  -534.7  -674.8 41 
Table VII 
Institutional Protection and the Use of Individual Bond Covenants 
 
This table seeks to examine how institutional investor protection affects the use of individual bond covenants.  The table reports Probit regression estimates of 
individual covenants dummies on creditor rights and shareholder rights.  Covenant classifications are reported in Appendix B, all other variables are described in 
Appendix A, and the sample period is 1991 to 2007.  Covenants used in at least 5% of bond issues are considered only.  All regressions include year and one-
digit industry dummy variables.  Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering by firm; the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  a, b, and c 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Mfx (Creditor rights index) and Mfx (Shareholder rights index) measure marginal effects of a 
one-unit change of either index on the dependent variable. 
 
  Payment restrictions    Borrowing restrictions 





























  (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Creditor rights index  -0.490
c  -0.469
c    -0.14  -0.441
c  -0.540
c  -0.154  -0.118  -0.350
b 
  (-3.58)  (-3.49)    (-1.47)  (-3.87)  (-3.92)  (-1.53)  (-1.19)  (-2.54) 
Shareholder rights index   0.446
c  0.389
b    0.176
a  0.377
b  0.542
c  0.03  0.022  0.007 
   (2.61)  (2.47)     (1.71)  (2.50)  (3.31)  (0.25)  (0.18)  (0.035) 
Other institutional variables  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm-level variables  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country variables  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bond variables  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mfx (Credit rights index)  -0.34%  -0.39%    -5.19%  -0.44%  -0.15%  -2.30%  -1.78%  -0.05% 
Mfx (Shareholder rights index)  0.31%  0.33%     6.55%  0.38%  0.15%  0.45%  0.33%  0.00% 
Observations  816  816    826  816  816  826  826  788 
Number of firms  368  368    375  368  368  375  375  362 




Table VII continued. 
 
  Stock restrictions     Asset restrictions     Anti-takeover restrictions     Default 
restrictions 

























  Cross-default 
acceleration 
covenant 
  (9)  (10)     (11)  (12)  (13)     (14)  (15)     (16) 
Creditor rights index  -0.636
c  -0.500
c    -0.345
c  -0.507
c  -0.028    -0.463
c  -0.011    -0.103 
  (-4.19)  (-2.75)    (-3.17)  (-3.52)  (-0.30)    (-3.83)  (-0.12)    (-1.21) 
Shareholder rights index   -0.550
a  0.11    0.511
c  -0.078  0.213
b    0.084  0.207
b    0.403
c 
   (-1.82)  (0.52)     (3.44)  (-0.45)  (2.15)     (0.59)  (2.12)     (3.86) 
Other institutional variables  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes 
Firm level variables  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes 
Country variables  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes 
Bond variables  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes 
Mfx (Credit rights index)  0.00%  -0.01%    -0.52%  -0.14%  -1.11%    -0.64%  -0.43%    -3.70% 
Mfx (Shareholder rights index)  0.00%  0.00%     0.77%  -0.02%  8.47%     0.12%  8.27%     14.49% 
Observations  775  827    816  754  812    816  812    826 
Number of firms  357  376    368  350  371    368  371    375 
Log Likelihood   -79.17  -67.88    -128.7  -87.94  -301.9    -119.7  -296.4    -315.8 43 
Table VIII 
Individual Components of Institutional Investor Protection and the Use of Bond Covenants 
 
This table examines how each component of the creditor rights index and shareholder rights index affects the use of 
bond covenants.  Panel A reports Poisson regression estimates of the covenant index (the number of protective 
covenants) individual components of creditor rights, and Panel B repeats the analysis for shareholder rights.  All 
variables are described in Appendix A, and the sample period is 1991 to 2007.  All regressions include year and one-
digit industry dummy variables.  Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering by firm; the associated t-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  a, b, and c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Components of creditor rights and the use of bond covenants 
 
  Covenant index 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Restriction on reorganization  0.021  -0.072       
  (0.23)  (0.74)       
No automatic asset freeze  -0.003    -0.152     
  (0.02)    (1.44)     
Secured creditor paid first  -0.528
c      -0.573
c   
  (3.55)      (4.05)   
Management does not stay  -0.083        -0.275
b 
  (0.56)        (2.65) 
Shareholder rights index   0.067  0.100
b  0.126
b  0.055  0.125
b 
   (1.13)  (2.21)  (2.22)  (1.33)  (2.54) 
Other institutional variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm level variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bond variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  827  827  827  827  827 
Number of firms  376  376  376  376  376 
Log likelihood  -1588.3  -1618.7  -1615.8  -1589.3  -1607.7 
 
 
Panel B: Components of shareholder rights and the use of bond covenants 
 
  Covenant index 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 








  (4.51)  (2.65)  (2.70)  (2.68)  (3.22)  (3.29)  (2.83) 
Vote by mail  0.078  0.093           
  (0.48)  (1.01)           
Shares not deposited  -0.11    -0.207
b         
  (0.87)    (2.17)         
Cumulative voting   0.083      0.151       
  (0.56)      (1.33)       
Oppressed minorities  0.26        0.294
b     
  (1.57)        (2.47)     
Preemptive rights  0.613
c          0.553
c   
  (3.66)          (3.72)   
Capital to call meeting  1.347            0.37 
   (0.64)                 (0.24) 
Other institutional variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm level variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bond variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  813  827  827  827  827  827  813 
Number of firms  371  376  376  376  376  376  371 
Log likelihood  -1534.1  -1614.3  -1610.8  -1613.5  -1608.9  -1592.5  -1570.8 44 
Table IX 
Firm-level Corporate Governance 
 
This table provides Poisson regression estimates of various covenant indices on creditor rights and shareholder 
rights, controlling for firm-level corporate governance.  Column (1) uses the overall covenant index, and columns 
(2) to (7) report numbers for various sub-indices of covenants.  Covenant classifications are reported in Appendix B, 
all other variables are described in Appendix A, and the sample period is 1991 to 2007.  Covenants used in at least 
5% of bond issues are considered only.  All regressions include year and one-digit industry dummy variables.  
Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering by firm; the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
a, b, and c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   Mfx (Creditor rights index), 
Mfx (Shareholder rights index), and Mfx (Firm-level governance) measure marginal effects of a one-unit change of 
either index on the dependent variable. 
 
  Covenant index 
  Total  Payment  Borrowing  Asset  Stock  Default  Anti-
takeover 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Creditor rights index  -0.188
b  -0.145  -0.168
b  -0.099  -0.735  -0.115  -0.087 
  (2.48)  (0.46)  (2.09)  (1.21)  (1.29)  (1.32)  (0.83) 
Shareholder rights index  0.179
b  2.833
c  -0.001  0.187
b  -0.059  0.306
b  0.252
b 
   (2.25)  (5.97)  (0.00)  (1.97)  (0.06)  (2.39)  (2.66) 
Corporate governance index  0.011
b  0.018  0.015
c  0.009
b  0.001  0.006  0.005 
  (2.51)  (0.58)  (3.13)  (1.98)  (0.04)  (0.94)  (0.83) 
Other institutional variables  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Firm level variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bond variables  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Mfx (Credit rights index)  -32.82%  0.00%  -6.01%  -4.82%  0.00%  -3.05%  -4.10% 
Mfx (Shareholder rights index)  31.14%  0.02%  -0.02%  9.08%  0.00%  8.09%  11.88% 
Mfx (Firm-level governance)  0.02%  0.00%  0.01%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Observations  391  388  391  391  391  391  388 
Number of firms  162  160  162  162  162  162  160 








This table provides Poisson regression estimates of various covenant indices on creditor and shareholder protection.  
Column (1) uses the overall covenant index, and columns (2) to (7) report numbers for various sub-indices.  Panel A 
reports results using the anti-self dealing index in Djankov et al. (2008) as an alternative measure of shareholder 
rights; Panel B shows results with controlling for legal origins; Panel C reports the results using a sample of one 
bond per firm with standard errors corrected for clustering by county.  Covenant classifications are reported in 
Appendix B, all other variables are described in Appendix A, and the sample period is 1991 to 2007.  Covenants 
used in at least 5% of bond issues are considered only.  All regressions include year and one-digit industry dummy 
variables.  Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering by firm (by country in Panel C); the associated t-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  a, b, and c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Mfx (Creditor rights index), Mfx (Shareholder rights index), and Mfx (Anti-self dealing index) measure marginal 
effects of a one-unit change of either index on the dependent variable. 
 
Panel A: Anti-self dealing index 
 
  Covenant index 
  Total  Payment  Borrowing  Asset  Stock  Default  Anti-
takeover 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Creditor rights index  -0.129
c  -0.209
b  -0.124
b  -0.091  -0.024  -0.160
b  -0.099
a 
  (2.55)  (2.29)  (2.35)  (1.60)  (0.21)  (2.61)  (1.88) 
Anti-self dealing index  0.348  -0.117  0.076  0.528  -3.306
c  0.796
c  0.442 
  (1.26)  (0.23)  (0.26)  (1.63)  (3.32)  (2.04)  (1.49) 
Other institutional variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm level variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bond variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mfx (Credit rights index)  -25.09%  -0.84%  -6.28%  -4.36%  -0.02%  -4.62%  -4.57% 
Mfx (Anti-self dealing index)  67.99%  0.47%  3.85%  25.28%  2.52%  22.98%  20.46% 
Observations  827  827  827  827  827  827  827 
Number of firms  376  376  376  376  376  376  376 




Panel B: Controlling for legal origins 
 
  Covenant index 
  Total  Payment  Borrowing  Asset  Stock  Default  Anti-
takeover 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Creditor rights index  -0.127
c  -0.289
c  -0.133




  (3.33)  (3.95)  (3.11)  (1.53)  (2.98)  (2.02)  (2.43) 




b  0.13  0.234
c  0.084
a 
  (3.09)  (2.24)  (2.12)  (2.59)  (0.81)  (4.32)  (1.74) 
Legal origin French  -0.030  0.407  0.015  -0.039  0.437  -0.047  -0.161 
  (0.27)  (1.20)  (0.11)  (0.29)  (1.21)  (0.29)  (1.30) 
Legal origin German  -0.653






  (3.67)  (0.80)  (2.35)  (3.98)  (28.88)  (2.69)  (3.53) 
Legal origin Scandinavian  -0.413
b  -0.64  -0.308
a  -0.455
c  -0.156  -0.055  -0.517
c 
  (2.54)  (1.02)  (1.73)  (3.01)  (0.24)  (0.34)  (3.31) 
Legal origin Socialist  -0.037  -0.099  -0.003  0.138  0.012  -0.285  -0.053 
  (0.20)  (0.17)  (0.01)  (0.54)  (0.02)  (1.07)  (0.24) 
Other institutional variables  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Firm level variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bond variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mfx (Credit rights index)  -25.26%  -1.36%  -6.89%  -3.32%  -0.04%  -3.35%  -4.48% 
Mfx (Shareholder rights index)  27.39%  1.44%  5.70%  7.26%  0.01%  6.85%  3.93% 
Observations  843  843  843  843  843  843  843 
Number of firms  388  388  388  388  388  388  388 
Log Likelihood   -1676.1  -289  -799.9  -710.3  -185  -549.7  -694.2 
 
 
Panel C: One bond per firm with clustering by country 
 
  Covenant index 
 
Total  Payment  Borrowing  Asset  Stock  Default  Anti-
takeover 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Creditor rights index  -0.147
b  -0.471
c  -0.136
b  -0.07  -0.466
b  -0.117
a  -0.064 
  (2.44)  (4.05)  (2.19)  (0.90)  (2.84)  (1.69)  (0.90) 




a  0.145  0.298
c  0.185 
  (2.27)  (2.10)  (2.24)  (1.80)  (0.52)  (3.48)  (1.42) 
Other institutional variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm level variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bond variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mfx (Credit rights index)  -19.98%  -0.03%  -5.43%  -2.33%  0.00%  -2.34%  -2.04% 
Mfx (Shareholder rights index)  36.18%  0.03%  9.66%  7.87%  0.00%  5.95%  5.88% 
Observations  361  361  361  361  361  361  361 
Number of firms  36  36  36  36  36  36  36 




Bond Covenants over Time 
 
The figure shows the use of covenants in bond contracts over time.  Panel A shows the frequency of bonds with 
covenants, Panel B displays the average number of covenants (i.e., the covenant index, see Appendix B), and Panel 
C reports the frequency of various types of covenants.   
 
 
Panel A: Frequency of bond with covenants over time 
 
Panel B: Number of covenants over time 
 
Panel C: Frequency of various types of covenants over time 48 
Appendix A 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variables  Description 
A. Country-level institutions 
Legal origin  Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country 
(English, French, Socialist, German, and Scandinavian).  Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998 and 1999). 
Creditor rights index  An index aggregating creditor rights.  A score of one is assigned when each of the 
following rights of secured lenders are defined in laws and regulations: (1) there are 
restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a debtor to file for 
reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the 
reorganization petition is approved, i.e., there is no automatic stay or asset freeze; (3) 
secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm, as 
opposed to other creditors such as government or workers; and (4) management does not 
retain administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization.  The 
index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights) and is constructed 
for every year from 1978 to 2003.  The index is time-varying and index values for the 
years 2004 to 2006 are set equal to the index values of the year 2003.  Sources: 
Bankruptcy and reorganization laws, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), and La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
Restrictions on 
reorganization (CR1) 
Variable equals 1 if there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum 
dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization, 0 otherwise.  Sources: Bankruptcy and 
reorganization laws, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), and La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
No automatic stay (CR2)  Variable equals 1 if secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the 
reorganization petition is approved, i.e., there is no automatic stay or asset freeze, 0 
otherwise.    Sources: Bankruptcy and reorganization laws, Djankov, McLiesh, and 
Shleifer (2007), and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
Secured creditor paid first 
(CR3) 
Variable equals 1 if secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a 
bankrupt firm, as opposed to other creditors such as government or workers, 0 otherwise.  
Sources: Bankruptcy and reorganization laws, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), 
and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
Management does not stay 
(CR4) 
Variable equals 1 if management does not retain administration of its property pending 
the resolution of the reorganization, 0 otherwise.   Sources: Bankruptcy and 
reorganization laws, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), and La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
Shareholder rights index  Revised LLSV anti-director rights index.  This index of Anti-director rights is formed by 
adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) 
shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ 
Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board 
of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) when 
shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting; 
and (6) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to ten percent (the sample 
median);  The range for the index is from zero to six.  Source: Djankov La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).  
Vote by mail (SR1)  Equals one if the company law or commercial code allows shareholders to mail their 
vote to the firm, and zero otherwise.  Source: Djankov La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer  (2008). 
Shares not deposited (SR2)  Equals one if the company law or commercial code does not allow firms to require that 
shareholders deposit their shares prior to a general shareholder meeting, thus preventing 
them from selling those shares for a number of days, and zero otherwise.   Source: 
Djankov La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 49 
Cumulative vote (SR3)  Equals one if the company law or commercial code allows shareholder to cast all their 
votes for one candidate standing for election to the board of directors (cumulative 
voting) or if the company law or commercial code allows a mechanism of proportional 
representation in the board by which minority interests may name a proportional number 
of directors to the board, and zero otherwise.  Source: Djankov La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 
Oppressed minorities (SR4)  Equals one if the company law or commercial code grants minority shareholders either a 
judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management or of the assembly or the right 
to step out of the company by requiring the company to purchase their shares when they 
object to certain fundamental changes, such as merges, asset dispositions, and changes in 
the articles of incorporation.  The variable equals zero otherwise.  Minority shareholders 
are defined as those shareholders who own 10 percent of share capital or less.  Source: 
Djankov La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 
Preemptive rights (SR5)  Equals one when the company law or commercial code grants shareholders the first 
opportunity to buy new issues of stock, and this right can be waived only by a 
shareholder’s vote; equals zero otherwise.  Source: Djankov La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (2008). 
Percentage of capital to call 
meeting (SR6) 
The minimum percentage of ownership of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call 
for an extraordinary shareholder’s meeting; it ranges from 1 to 33 percent.  Source: 
Djankov La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer  (2008) 
Spamann Anti-director 
index 
An index of anti-director rights is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their 
shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional 
representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that 
entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or 
equal to 10% (the sample median), or (6) when shareholders have preemptive rights that 
can only be waived by a shareholders’ meeting.  The range for the index is from 0 to 5.  
Source: Spamann (2008). 
Anti-self dealing index   An index of anti-self dealing is formed by taking the average of ex-ante and ex-post 
private control of self-dealing indices.   The  Index of ex-ante control of self-dealing 
transactions  is an average of approval by  disinterested shareholders and ex-ante 
disclosure.  The Index of ex-post control of self-dealing transactions is an average of 
disclosures in periodic filings and ease of proving wrongdoing.  Source: Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) 
Public enforcement index  In index that measured the quality of public enforcement of securities laws.  The index 
equals the arithmetic mean of (1) supervisor characteristics index, (2) rule-making power 
index, (3) investigative powers index, (4) orders index, and (5) criminal index.  Higher 
index values indicate greater enforcement.  Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2006). 
Enforceability of contracts  The relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored and complications 
presented by language and mentality differences.  Scale for 0 to 10, with higher scores 
indicating higher enforceability.    Source:  Business Environmental Risk Intelligence.   
Exact definition in Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer (1995). 
Efficiency of bankruptcy   The relative efficiency in the outcome of a bankruptcy case.  The estimated present value 
of the terminal value of the firm after bankruptcy costs in the case of Mirage hotel in 
Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2008).  Source: Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and 
Shleifer (2008).   
Days of contract 
enforcement  
The number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts.  The data are based on 
the methodology in Djankov et al. (2003) but describe the number of calendar days to 
enforce a contract of unpaid debt worth 50% of the country's GDP per capita.   The 
variable is constructed as at January 2003.  Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008).  
Public information sharing   The variable equals 1 if a public credit registry operates in the country, 0 otherwise.  A 
public registry is defined as a database owned by public authorities (usually the Central 
Bank or Banking Supervisory Authority), that collects information on the standing of 
borrowers in the financial system and makes it available to financial institutions.  The 50 
variable is constructed as at January for every year from 1978 to 2003.  Source: 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). 
Effectiveness of bankruptcy 
law 
Assessment of the effectiveness  of bankruptcy law.    Low score indicates creditor 
protection law is nonexistent or pporly enforced, High score indicates creditor protection 
law is well defined and strictly enforced.  Scale from 0 to 7.  Source: WEF, Global 
Competitiveness Report (2005). 
Rule of law  The variable measures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence.  Average of index between 1996 and 2007.  Higher scores indicate greater 
tradition of rule of law.  Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008), see also 
http://www.govindicators.org. 
Property rights  Index of property rights.  Source: http://www.heritage.org 
Ownership concentration  Average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the 
ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country.  A firm is 
considered privately-owned if the State is not a known shareholder in it.  Source: La 
Porta,Lopez-de-Silances, and Shleifer (2006). 
B. Bond-level variables 
Offering size  Amount borrowed in million U.S. dollars. 
Maturity  Number of days until to the bond’s maturity. 
Private  Variable equals 1 if the bond is a private placement exempt from registration under SEC 
Rule 144a, 0 otherwise. 
Call  Variable equals 1 if the bond is callable, 0 otherwise 
Put  Variable equals 1 if the bond is putable, 0 otherwise.  
Secured  Variable equals 1 if the bond is secured, 0 otherwise. 
Highyield  Variable equals 1 if the bond rating is below Baa or BBB, 0 otherwise 
C. Firm-level variables 
Firm size  Total assets in U.S. dollars. 
ROA  Return-on-assets defined as net income divided by total assets. 
R&D / firm size  Expenses for research and development divided by total assets.   
PPE / firm size  Property, plant, and equipment to total assets. 
Market to book ratio  Market-to-book value defined as the market capitalization of stock plus total debt 
divided by total assets. 
Leverage  Financial leverage defined as the sum of long and short term debt divided by total assets.  
Corporate governance index  Average corporate governance score of a firm from 2003 to 2007.  Source: ISS. 
Cross-listing  Variable equals 1 if the firm participates in an ADR program at the time of the bond 
issue or directly listed in U.S. stock exchanges, and 0 otherwise.  Source: Bank of New 
York, Citigroup, and JP Morgan. 
Dividend  Variable equals 1 if a firm paid dividend and 0 otherwise. 
D. Other variables 
Sovereign rating  We code Standard & Poors sovereign credit ratings into Comprehensive Credit Rating 
(CCR) as described in Appendix C following Gande and Parsley (2007).  Source: 
Standard & Poors. 
GDP / capita  Real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars (basis: year 2000).  Source: World Bank. 
Inflation  Inflation measured as the change of the GDP deflator.  Source: World Bank. 
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Corresponding variable in FISD  Definition (FISD) 
Payment   Dividend payment  Isu_dividends_related_payments   Flag indicating that payments made to shareholders or other entities may be limited to a 
certain percentage of net income or some other ratio. 
Sub_dividends_related_payments   Limits the subsidiaries’ payment of dividends to a certain percentage of net income or some 
other ratio.  For captive finance subsidiaries, this provision limits the amount of dividends 
which can be paid to the parent.  This provision protects the debt holder against a parent from 
draining assets from its subsidiaries.  
Other payment  Isu_restricted_payments   Restricts issuer’s freedom to make payment (other than dividend related payments) to 
shareholders and others. 
Borrowing  Funded debt  Sub_funded_debt   Restricts issuer’s subsidiaries from issuing additional funded debt (debt with an initial 
maturity of longer than one year). 
Isu_funded_debt   Restricts issuer from issuing additional funded debt.  Funded debt is an debt with an initial 
maturity of one year or longer. 
Subordinated debt  Isu_subordinated_debt_issuance   Restricts issuance of junior or subordinated debt 
Senior debt  Isu_senior_debt_issuance   Restricts issuer to the amount of senior debt is may issuers in the future. 
Secured debt  Negative_pledge_covenant  The issuer cannot issue secured debt unless it secures the current issue on a pari passu basis. 
Indebtedness  Isu_indebtedness   Restricts user from incurring additional debt with limits on absolute dollar amount of debt 
outstanding or percentage total capital. 
Sub_indebtedness   Restricts the total indebtedness of the subsidiaries. 
Isu_leverage_test  Restricts total-indebtedness of the issuer. 
Sub_leverage_test  Limits subsidiaries’ leverage. 
Leaseback  Isu_leaseback   Restricts issuer to the type or amount of property used in a sale leaseback transaction and may 
restrict its use of the proceeds of the sale.  A sale leaseback transaction is a method of raising 
capital in which an organization sells some specific assets to an entity that simultaneously 
leases the asset back to the organization for a fixed term and agreed upon rate.  
Sub_sales_leaseback   Restricts subsidiaries from selling then leasing back assets that provide security for the 
debtholder.  This provision usually requires that assets or cash equal to the property sold and 
leased back be applied to the retirement of the debt in question or used to acquire another 
property to increase the debtholders’ security. 
Liens  Sub_liens   Restricts subsidiaries from acquiring liens on their property. 
Isu_liens   In the case of default, the bondholders have the legal right to sell mortgaged property to satisfy 
their unpaid obligations. 
Guarantee  Subsidiary_guarantee   Subsidiary is restricted from issuing guarantees for the payment of interest and/or principal of 
certain debt obligations. 52 
 
 
Asset  Asset sales  Asset_sale_clause   Covenant requiring the issuer to use net proceeds from the sale of certain assets to redeem the 
bonds at par of at a premium.  This covenant does not limit the issuers right to sell assets. 
Isu_sale_assets   Restriction on the ability of an issuer to sell assets or restrictions on the issuer’s use of the 
proceeds from the sale of assets.  Such restrictions may require the issuer to apply some or all 
of the sales proceed to the repurchase of debt through a tender offer or call.  
Sub_sale_assets_unrestricted   Issuer must use proceeds from sale of subsidiaries’ assets (either certain asset sales or all asset 
sales over some threshold) to reduce debt. 
Transaction  Isu_transaction_affiliates   Issuer is restricted in certain business dealings with its subsidiaries. 
Investment   Isu_investments   Restricts issuer’s investment policy to prevent risky investments. 
Sub_investments_unrestricted   Restricts subsidiaries’ investment. 
Stock  Common stock  Isu_stock_issuance_issuer   Restricts issuer from issuing additional common stocks. 
Sub_stock_issuance   Restricts issuer from issuing additional common stock in restricted subsidiaries.  Restricted 
subsidiaries are those which are considered to be consolidated for financial test purposes.  
Preferred stock  Sub_preferred_stock_issuance   Restricts subsidiaries’ ability to issue preferred stock 
Other stock  Isu_stock_transfer_sale   Restricts the issuer from transferring, selling, or disposing of it’s own common or the common 
stock of a subsidiary. 
Default  Default  cross_acceleration   A bondholder protective covenant that allows the holder to accelerate their debt, if any other 
debt of the organization has be accelerated due to an event of default. 
cross_default   A bondholder protective covenant that will activate an event of default in their issue, if an 
event of default has occurred under any other debt of the company. 
Anti-
takeover 
Poison put  change_control_put_provisions   Upon a change of control in the issuer, bondholders have the option of selling the issue back to 
the issuer (poison put).  Other conditions may limit the bondholder’s ability to exercise the put 
option.  Poison puts are often used when a company fears an unwanted takeover by ensuring 
that a successful hostile takeover bid will trigger an event that substantially reduce the value of 
the company. 
Merger   isu_consolidation_merger   Indicates that a consolidation or merger of the issuer with another entity is restricted. 
Profit  Earnings  isu_fixed_charge_coverage   Issuer is required to have a ratio of earnings available for fixed charges, of at least a minimum 
specified level.  
sub_fixed_charge_coverage   Subsidiaries are required to maintain a minimum ratio of net income to fixed charges. 
isu_net_earnings_test_issuance   To issue additional debt the issuer must have achieved or maintained certain profitability 
levels.  This test is a variation of the (more common) fixed coverage tests. 
Net worth  isu_maintenance_net_worth   Issuer must maintain a minimum specified net worth. 




Rating decline  rating_decline_trigger_put   A decline in the credit rating of the issuer (or issue) triggers a bond holder put provision. 
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Comprehensive Credit Rating 
 
Following Gande and Parsley (2007) we code S&P sovereign credit ratings using the following chart.  The reported 
credit rating is assigned a numerical code from 0 through 21 to obtain the explicit credit rating (ECR).  Next, we add 
the reported information on the credit outlook (COL), coded from -1 to +1, to obtain the comprehensive credit rating 
(CCR), i.e., CCR = ECR + COL.  For example, if a country is rated BB+ with stable credit outlook, its ECR and 
CCR are 11.  If S&P revises the outlook to credit watch-negative (from stable), the ECR remains 11.  However, its 
CCR is 10.50. 
 
Explicit credit rating (ECR)  Credit Outlook (COL) 
Sovereign rating  Conversion number  Outlook  Conversion number 
AAA  21  Positive  1 
AA+  20  Credit Watch-Developing  0.5 
AA  19  Stable  0 
AA-  18  Credit Watch-Negative  -0.5 
A+  17  Negative  -1 
A  16     
A-  15     
BBB+  14     
BBB  13     
BBB-  12     
BB+  11     
BB  10     
BB-  9     
B+  8     
B  7     
B-  6     
CCC+  5     
CCC  4     
CCC-  3     
CC  2     
C  1     
SD, D  0     
 
 